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T 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
     
      he armed conflicts currently underway in Syria have grown from a popu-
lar uprising which started in February–March 2011 to become a complex set 
of conflicts involving myriad contending parties that include both State and 
non-State actors.1 This article will attempt to provide a classification of the 
various conflicts currently underway within the borders of the Syrian Arab 
Republic from the perspective of international humanitarian law (IHL) and 
assess how they relate to each other and to related but separate conflicts 
taking place in neighboring countries. It will also consider the two main 
contending views concerning the role consent of the government to foreign 
military intervention plays in classification of conflict and determine how 
this affects the manner in which the conflicts in Syria are characterized. Fi-
nally, it will comment on the extent to which the classification of the con-
flict matters in terms of the applicable law.  
The article is structured as follows. First, a short factual overview of the 
various parties and their alignments within the conflicts will be provided in 
Part II. This will serve as a basis for further assessment and evaluation of 
the applicable law. Following that, the applicable law relating to the classifi-
cation of conflict under IHL will be set out in Part III. In that context, the 
two main contending views relating to the effect of consent (or lack there-
of) by a government to foreign military intervention will be discussed. In 
Part IV, the law relating to the classification of conflicts will be applied to 
the factual situation set out in Part II. In Part V attention will be devoted 
to the question whether and to what extent the classification of a conflict 
matters in terms of the applicable law. Finally, in Part VI, a number of con-
clusions will be drawn.  
 
II. THE MAIN CONTENDERS 
 
There are reportedly hundreds (by some accounts approximately 1,500) of 
armed groups and militias active in the Syrian conflict.2 Many, indeed most 
of them, follow their own agendas and are primarily active on a local level. 
                                                                                                                      
1. For an overview of the conflict in Syria, see Involvement in Armed Conflicts: Syria, 
RULAC, http://www.rulac.org/countries/syria (last visited May 30, 2016). 
2. CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33487, ARMED 
CONFLICT IN SYRIA: OVERVIEW AND U.S. RESPONSE 9 (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www. 
fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf.  
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The situation is fluid and characterized by a shifting pattern of alliances, 
cooperation and clashes between the various groups. It would be well-nigh 
impossible to draw a coherent picture of the entire mosaic of armed groups 
and their aims, actions and alignments. Nevertheless, it is possible to identi-
fy the main parties and give an overall picture of where they stand in the 
conflicts. In addition, a number of States have directly intervened in Syria, 
some with, others without, Syrian government consent. As will next be 
discussed, the multitude of actors has resulted in a number of interrelated 
overlapping armed conflicts, but ones which have certain aspects of partic-
ularity in terms of the protagonists and their respective aims.  
 
A. Syrian Government and its Allies 
 
The Syrian government of President Bashar al Assad is still in control of 
the capital; the machinery of government; the armed forces; much of the 
western part of the country, which provides the government at least partial 
control of nearly all the major urban centers such as Homs, Hama and 
Aleppo; and almost all the coastal region, including the port of Latakia. The 
armed forces, although much diminished in size since the outbreak of the 
conflict due to losses and desertion, are still estimated to have 100,000–
125,000 personnel and are the only Syrian party in the conflicts with air and 
naval forces.3 Notwithstanding the withdrawal of recognition by a signifi-
cant number of important States within the region and further afield, the 
Syrian government still maintains diplomatic relations with a large number 
of countries and continues to represent the country in the United Nations. 
It is consequently still the “Government of Syria” from an international 
legal perspective.4 
The Syrian government is supported within the country by a large pro-
government militia known as the National Defense Forces (NDF), which 
                                                                                                                      
3. Id. at 12 
4. There is a strong presumption in favor of an established government as constitut-
ing the government of a State. Non-recognition of governments has little legal significance 
and is primarily a political signal of disapproval of a particular government’s policies. As 
long as the government has control over essential parts of a State and State apparatus such 
as the armed forces, treasury, etc. and continues to enjoy wide representation and conduct 
international relations on behalf of the State, it is presumed to be the government of that 
State from a legal perspective. For commentary on recognition of governments and its 
primarily political function, see e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 88–93 (4th ed. 1990); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 328–32 
(7th ed. 2014).  
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has been organized by the government with Iranian assistance. It partici-
pates in both defensive and offensive operations against opposition forces 
under the overall coordination of the armed forces. The NDF and associ-
ated pro-government militias reportedly number between 60,000 and 
80,000 fighters. In addition to these indigenous forces, there are also a large 
number of foreigners fighting on behalf of the government. These include 
the Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah, with an estimated 5,000–8,000 fight-
ers active in Syria, and between 5,000 and 10,000 Iraqi and Afghan Shiite 
fighters organized in separate units and fighting alongside other pro-
government forces.5 
Two States are known to have military forces active in the conflict in 
support of the Syrian government. These are Iran, which has close ties with 
the Assad government and has reportedly deployed several thousand 
members of the Revolutionary Guard in direct support of Syrian military 
operations, in addition to providing training, military advice and substantial 
financial support,6 and the Russian Federation, which had approximately 
4,000 personnel deployed in Syria as of November 2015.7 The Russian 
forces have included ground forces, naval units and, in particular, combat 
aircraft and helicopters that have been used in airstrikes against ISIS and 
other opposition groups since their arrival in the country in late August–
early September 2015. 
Both Russia and Iran have, alongside other aims, the shared objective 
of shoring up their common ally the Syrian government, aiding it in regain-
ing some of the strategic areas it has lost, and ensuring the inclusion of the 
government and its supporters in any overall peace agreement that may 
emerge. For its part, the Syrian government is intent on retaining as much 
                                                                                                                      
5. THE CARTER CENTER, SYRIA: PRO-GOVERNMENT PARAMILITARY FORCES 4 
(2013), https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-co 
nflict/Pro-GovernmentParamilitaryForces.pdf; see also BLANCHARD ET AL., supra note 5, at 
12. 
6. Sam Dagher & Asa Fitch, Iran Expands Role in Syria in Conjunction with Russia’s Air-
strikes, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-expands 
-role-in-syria-in-conjunction-with-russias-airstrikes-1443811030. See also Iran’s Evolving Pol-
icy in Iraq and Syria, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 8, 2015), http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?ar 
ticleid=1032642887&Country=Syria&topic=Politicst. 
7. Maria Tsvetkova, Russian Soldiers Geolocated by Photos in Multiple Syria Locations, Bloggers 
Say, REUTERS, Nov. 8, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-
russia-idUSKCN0SX0H820151108. In March 2016, Russia announced a partial withdraw-
al of its forces; however, significant forces will remain. See Putin the Peacemaker, THE 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 2016, at 31, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-afr 
ica/21694996-putin-appears-turn-hard-power-diplomacy-russians-show-their-hand. 
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power as possible and not being excluded from any settlement that may be 
reached.   
 
B. The Mainstream Syrian Opposition and the Al Nusra Front 
 
The Syrian opposition consists of a large number of disparate armed 
groups and local militias, which can be roughly divided into two main coali-
tions (not including either the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or the 
Kurdish opposition, both of which will be treated separately). One of these 
is the loose coalition (or rather two sub-coalitions) composed of a mixture 
of secular and Islamist armed groups that together form the mainstream 
opposition. The secular opposition includes a number of armed groups 
collectively known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which emerged in the 
early stages of the anti-government insurgency in 2011 and is partly made 
up of former members of the armed forces. However, despite the name, 
the FSA is possibly as much a label as a coherent military organization and 
has lost much terrain to other opposition groups, in particular to the Islam-
ist opposition.8 The mainstream Islamist opposition is loosely organized 
into what is known as the Islamic Front.9 These two mainstream opposi-
tion armed groups cooperate to a certain extent and each has received a 
significant degree of foreign support in the form of arms, training and fi-
nances. However, neither has a central command structure that exercises 
effective operational control over the various groups under its umbrella. 
Moreover, some of the groups have clashed with one another. Some of 
these opposition groups are represented in the Syrian National Coalition, 
the political arm of part of the opposition,10 which has been recognized by 
some eighty States and the European Union as the “legitimate representa-
tives of the Syrian people” and is represented in the Arab League.11  
                                                                                                                      
8. See, e.g., JOSEPH HALLIDAY, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR MIDDLE EAST 
SECURITY REPORT 3: SYRIA’S ARMED OPPOSITION 6, 14–17 (2012), http://www.under 
standingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_Armed_Opposition.pdf. 
9. Leading Syrian Rebel Groups Form New “Islamic Front,” BBC (Nov. 22, 2013), http://w 
ww.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25053525. 
10. Abdullah Rebhy, Syrian Opposition Groups Reach Unity Deal, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 
22, 2012), http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/syrian-opposition-groups-reach-un 
ity-deal/. 
11. The Free Syrian Army is represented in the Syrian National Council (SNC); how-
ever, the Islamic Front rejects the SNC. See, e.g., “Their Own Men”: Islamist Rebels Sever Ties 
with the Political Opposition, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.economist.com 
/news/middle-east-and-africa/21586879-islamist-rebels-sever-ties-political-opposition-the 
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The other main coalition is made up of a variety of jihadist armed 
groups associated with the Al Qaida movement; the most important of 
which is the Al Nusra Front and its allies. This coalition, while vehemently 
opposed to the government, has clashed with the more secular non-jihadist 
opposition on occasion, and has taken control of areas formerly in the 
hands of the mainstream opposition in the northern part of Syria. Al Nusra 
does, however, cooperate with some of the groups within the more main-
stream Islamic Front, but, after it rejected a merger with ISIS in February 
2014, the two groups have gone separate ways.12 The various groups which 
make up the Islamic Front are divided in their attitude toward the Al Qai-
da-affiliated Al Nusra and ISIS; some have terminated cooperation with the 
secular opposition and, in fact, are more aligned with the jihadist groups 
than with the mainstream opposition.13 However, the patterns of alignment 
and infighting between opposition groups is fluid and subject to change, 
making it extremely difficult to draw a coherent picture of how groups 
stand at any particular time and their objectives beyond stating that they are 
as much rivals for power as opponents to the government. It is estimated 
that the various opposition groups, including the Al Nusra Front, but ex-
cluding ISIS and the Kurdish opposition, controlled approximately 20 per-
cent of Syrian territory as of late 2015.14 The primary aim of the main-
                                                                                                                      
ir-own-men. For an overview of the international recognition of the SNC and its member-
ship in the Arab League, see National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, 
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Coalition_for_Syrian_Revolutionary 
_and_Opposition_Forces (last visited May 30, 2016). 
12. For an extensive treatment of Al Nusra’s strategy and objectives, see JENNIFER 
CAFARELLA, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 25: 
JABHAT AL-NUSRA IN SYRIA—AN ISLAMIC CALIPHATE FOR AL-QAEDA (2014), http://ww 
w.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/JN%20Final.pdf. The Khorasan Group coor-
dinates with and is affiliated to some extent with Al Nusra, sharing common roots with 
the Al Qaida umbrella organization, but has a separate agenda, which according to U.S. 
intelligence includes conducting strikes against Western targets inside and outside the re-
gion. See, e.g., Syria Airstrikes Fail to Cripple Khorasan Threat, TIMES OF AP (Oct. 10, 2014), htt 
p://timesofap.com/politics/syria-airstrikes-failed-to-cripple-khorasan-threat.html. For an 
overview of Syrian rebel groups and the split between Al Nusra and ISIS, see, e.g., Erika 
Solomon & Oliver Holmes, Factbox: Syria’s Rebel Groups, REUTERS (Jan. 3, 2014), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-rebels-factbox-idUSBREA120O220140203. 
13. For information regarding the attitude of various Syrian opposition armed groups 
to ISIS, see Aron Lund, Pushing Back against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant: The Islamic 
Front, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Jan. 8, 2014), http://car 
negieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54121.  
14. For an overview of the relative area under control of various parties to the con-
flict, see Joshua Landis, Why Syria is the Gordian Knot of Obama’s Anti-ISIL Campaign, 
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stream opposition is overthrow of the present government, but the secular-
ists and Islamists do not necessarily share the same longer term objective 
regarding the type of government they want to establish if that aim were 
achieved. The jihadist Al Nusra Front and some of the other more main-
stream Islamist groups’ objective is to establish a Salafist theocratic gov-
ernment, but beyond that their agendas may also differ radically.  
  
C. ISIS 
 
ISIS (also known as IS, ISIL and Daesh) originated in Iraq as an affiliate of 
the Al Qaida movement. It grew out of the organization known as Al Qai-
da in Iraq which was active in the anti-United States/anti-Iraqi government 
insurgency from 2003 to 2013. In the early years of the Syrian conflict, ISIS 
was reportedly instrumental in helping to establish Al Nusra in Syria and 
has been active in the Syrian conflict since 2013. Following Al Nusra’s re-
fusal to merge with ISIS in February 2014, the two movements are no 
longer directly connected and, as stated previously, are opposed to each 
other, at least to some extent.15 
ISIS controls a large swath of territory in Syria and Iraq and has its op-
erational headquarters in the Syrian provincial city of Rakka. It is a self-
proclaimed caliphate dedicated to establishing an ultra-radical Salafist Is-
lamic State. Known for its radical version of Islam and its extremely brutal 
tactics, ISIS is involved in armed conflict with the Syrian government, the 
mainstream opposition and Kurdish forces in northern Syria; with the Iraqi 
government and Kurdish forces in the Kurdish autonomous region of 
northern Iraq; and with a significant number of States which support either 
the Syrian or Iraqi governments, or both. It has a highly coherent and ef-
fective military organization and a civil administration in the areas in which 
it exercises control. Estimates of its fighting strength vary, but according to 
the CIA it has some 20,000–31,500 fighters in Syria and Iraq. Other esti-
mates place this total considerably higher.16 
                                                                                                                      
ALJAZEERA AMERICA (Sept. 15, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/15/ 
why-syria-is-thegordianknotofobamasantiisilcampaign.html. 
15. See, e.g., What is “Islamic State,” BBC (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-middle-east-29052144. 
16. Id. See also Jim Sciutto, Jamie Crawford & Chelsea J. Carter, ISIS Can “Muster” be-
tween 20,000 and 31,500 Fighters, CIA Says, CNN (Sept. 12, 2014), http://edition.cnn 
.com/2014/09/11/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq/ (CNN quoting a CIA source on the 
strength of ISIS in September 2014). Other sources quote figures ranging from 80,000 to 
200,000 fighters. See, e.g., Islamic State “Has 50,000 Fighters in Syria,” ALJAZEERA (Aug. 19, 
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D. Kurdish Militias 
 
The de facto autonomous region of Syrian Kurdistan (also known as Roja-
va) is located in the northern area of Syria adjoining the border with Tur-
key. After the Syrian government withdrew its forces from most of the 
region in 2012, it came under the control of the Kurdish National Council 
and its subsidiary, the Kurdish Supreme Committee (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as the Kurdish Administration), which exercises political control 
over the areas it controls and over the armed Kurdish militias, principally 
the People’s Protection Units (YPG). The YPG and associated Kurdish 
militias have clashed in the past with Islamist opposition armed groups 
over control of border crossings with Turkey, in particular with ISIS, which 
controls areas of territory directly adjacent to the Kurdish region. In these 
clashes, ISIS has lost significant amounts of territory to the YPG. Turkey 
has condemned the YPG and Kurdish Administration as a terrorist organi-
zation affiliated with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) with which Turkey 
has been in a longstanding armed conflict. There have been a number of 
armed clashes between Turkish forces and the YPG as a result of this mu-
tual hostility.17  
The Turkish claim that the YPG is a terrorist organization is not shared 
by Western governments and the United States has carried out numerous 
airstrikes in direct support of YPG forces in action against ISIS. The YPG 
receives a measure of foreign support from other, mostly Western, gov-
ernments, including arms and non-lethal military equipment, and has had 
limited military assistance from the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga militia.18 It 
controls approximately 11.5 percent of Syria’s territory and reportedly has 
around 40,000 fighters.19 The primary aim of the Kurdish political organi-
                                                                                                                      
2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/islamic-state-50000-fighters 
-syria-2014819184258421392.html (citing 50,000 ISIS fighters in Syria and another 30,000 
in Iraq). 
17. See Jonathan Steele, The Syrian Kurds are Winning!, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 
(Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/12/03/syrian-kurds-are-winni 
ng/ (reviewing MICHAEL M. GUNTER, OUT OF NOWHERE: THE KURDS OF SYRIA IN 
PEACE AND WAR (2015)). 
18. Id. 
19. Tom Perry, Syrian Kurds Now Say They Now Control Territory the Size of Qatar and Ku-
wait Combined, UK BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 14, 2015), http://uk.businessinsider.com/syr 
ian-kurds-now-say-they-now-control-territory-the-size-of-qatar-and-kuwait-combined-201 
5-8?r=US&IR=T. 
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zations and the Kurdish militias is to achieve recognized far-reaching au-
tonomy, resist its mortal enemy ISIS, and maintain and consolidate control 
over the Kurdish populated regions in Syria.  
 
E. Anti-ISIS Coalition and Turkey 
 
The United States led anti-ISIS coalition, which is actively engaged in con-
ducting airstrikes against ISIS within Syria, consists of a group of some ten 
Western and regional States. Most of these are also engaged in conducting 
operations against ISIS in Iraq, but several of the coalition members have 
confined their operations to Syria (Turkey, Saudi Arabia and United Arab 
Emirates), while some States (Denmark and Belgium) engaged against ISIS 
in Iraq have to date not conducted operations in Syria.20 Based on infor-
mation from the U.S. Department of Defense, as of April 26, 2016, the 
coalition had carried out a total of 3,809 airstrikes within Syria, 3,577 con-
ducted by the United States and 232 by other coalition members.21  
The coalition commenced operations in August 2014 at the request of 
the Iraqi government following the advance of ISIS forces deep into Iraqi 
territory during that summer.22 The members of the coalition have based 
their use of force inside Syria on the right of (collective) self-defense in 
response to the advance of ISIS into Iraq and in response to terrorist acts 
attributed to ISIS in a number of States, including Turkey and France.23 
                                                                                                                      
20. The States participating in airstrikes against ISIS in Syria are Australia, Bahrain, 
France, Jordan, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United 
Kingdom and United States. For official figures, see Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Oper-
ations against ISIL Terrorists, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (Apr. 26, 2016), http:// 
www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve. Canada withdrew from 
active participation in airstrikes in February 2016, but at the same time tripled its involve-
ment in the ground conflict. Emily Chan, “It is More Risky”: Canada Enters New Role in Anti-
ISIS Fight, CTV NEWS (Feb. 14, 2016), http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/it-is-more-risky-
canada-enters-new-role-in-anti-isis-fight-1.2777342.  
21. Operation Inherent Resolve, supra note 20. 
22. Id. 
23. The United States informed the UN Security Council in September 2014 that it 
relied on Article 51 of the UN Charter as the legal basis for conducting airstrikes against 
ISIS in Syria in support of Iraq. See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, U.S. Invokes Iraq’s Defense in Legal 
Justification of Syria Strikes, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2 
014/09/24/us/politics/us-invokes-defense-of-iraq-in-saying-strikes-on-syria-are-legal.htm 
l?_r=0. Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom have similarly invoked collective self-
defense as the legal basis for their airstrikes. See Raphael Van Steenberghe, From Passive 
Consent to Self-Defence after the Syrian Protest against the US-led Coalition, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 23, 
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The Syrian government has not consented to the coalition’s operations 
within its territory and has characterized them as a violation of its sover-
eignty and as unlawful.24 At the same time, the Syrian government has not 
actively opposed the coalition airstrikes and has refrained from taking ac-
tion against coalition aircraft in its airspace. None of the coalition airstrikes 
have targeted Syrian government forces, installations or territory held by 
government forces. They have been almost exclusively directed against 
ISIS forces, oil installations operated by ISIS within territory it controls or 
targets in areas where its forces are active. The United States has conducted 
at least several airstrikes against the Khorasan Group within the Al Nusra 
Front.25 Turkey has conducted a number of airstrikes and artillery bom-
bardments against Syrian Kurdish forces and territory held by them, as it 
sees the YPG as an ally or extension of the PKK inside Turkey.26 By con-
trast, the United States has coordinated a large number airstrikes within 
Syria with the YPG and provided it with close air support in helping it re-
take control of certain key towns from ISIS.  
 
III. CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICT UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAR-
IAN LAW AND THE ROLE OF CONSENT IN DETERMINING CONFLICT 
CLASSIFICATION  
 
A. Recognized Types of Armed Conflict under International Humanitarian Law 
 
Under IHL (also known as the law of armed conflict), there are two recog-
nized types of armed conflict, each governed by its own legal regime. An 
international armed conflict (IAC) is one between two or more States and 
                                                                                                                      
2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/13758-2/. For an analysis of the UK position, see, e.g., 
Arabella Lang, Legal Basis for UK Military Action in Syria, VOLTAIRENET.ORG (Nov. 26, 
2015), http://www.voltairenet.org/article189449.html. France had initially cited collective 
self-defense as the legal justification for its actions, but following the November 13, 2015 
attacks in Paris and Saint-Denis indicated it was now also acting in individual self-defense. 
See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 70th Sess., 7565th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7565 (Nov. 20, 2015). 
24. Permanent Rep. of the Syrian Arab Republic to the U.N., Identical Letters dated 
September 16, 2015 from the Permanent Rep. of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/2015/718 (Sept. 17, 2015). 
25. See Jordain Carney, US Targets the Khorasan Group with a New Round of Airstrikes, 
DEFENSEONE (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2014/11/us-targets-
khorasan-group-new-round-airstrikes/98417/. 
26. See Turkey v Syrian Kurds v Islamic State, BBC (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.bbc.com 
/news/world-middle-east-33690060. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2016 
 
363 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is subject to the rules of all applicable treaties to which the belligerent 
States are party and to customary IHL rules pertaining to such conflicts. 
The threshold for such a conflict according to the generally held position 
(to which this author subscribes) is low and is often referred to as “the first 
shot theory.” 27 Under this approach, any use of force by one State against 
another State’s armed forces, or any total or partial occupation of another 
State’s territory irrespective of whether it is opposed, will trigger the exist-
ence of an armed conflict between those States.28 According to this view, a 
border skirmish or isolated incident would not require the application of 
the whole body of IHL (e.g., the rules relating to the treatment of prisoners 
of war do not apply until prisoners have in fact been taken and the rules of 
belligerent occupation only apply if territory is placed under occupation, 
etc.). This is not to say that IHL would not apply, it is simply the conse-
quence of the factual situation. 
The other theory relating to the IAC threshold presumes that relatively 
small-scale incidents between State armed forces do not trigger an armed 
conflict; that only a reasonably sustained use of force by one State against 
another State, or sustained conflict between their armed forces are required 
for the existence of an international armed conflict.29 This approach risks 
creating a legal vacuum, which is why the low threshold is generally held as 
the better view.30 
The second type of armed conflict is a non-international armed conflict 
(NIAC) in which at least one of the parties is a non-State actor (ordinarily 
an organized armed group (OAG)). The threshold for this type of armed 
                                                                                                                      
27. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, XXXVIII ROUND TABLE 
ON CURRENT ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE DISTINCTION BE-
TWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS: CHALLENGES 
FOR IHL? Sanremo, Sept. 3–5, at 3 (2015), http://www.iihl.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2015/12/Pedrazzi.pdf [hereinafter IIHL XXXVIII ROUND TABLE]. 
28. See, e.g., Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE 
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN 
THE FIELD 32–33 (Jean Pictet ed. 1952) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY (1952)].  
29. Use of Force Committee, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION: REPORT OF THE SEVENTY-FOURTH 
CONFERENCE 677, 692–708 (Christine Chinkin, Sarah Nouwen & Christopher Ward eds., 
2010).  
30. Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 32, 41–42 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst 
ed., 2012). 
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conflict is somewhat higher, requiring the parties to have a minimum de-
gree of organization sufficient to conduct and coordinate operations and a 
degree of intensity that rises above internal unrest, sporadic violence or 
terrorist incidents.31 Such a conflict can be between a government and one 
or more OAGs, or between two or more OAGs.32 Some writers have put 
forward arguments in favor of accepting a third category of armed conflict, 
sometimes referred to as a “transnational armed conflict.”33 Such a classifi-
cation could apply to conflicts between a State and an OAG which oper-
ates across international frontiers; however, this theory has not gained gen-
eral acceptance and will not be considered further.34 Thus, in situations 
where an OAG engages in operations that cross international borders, the 
conflict will either be international or non-international in character. It is 
argued below that such conflicts remain non-international unless certain 
conditions are met.  
If an OAG is acting under the control of an outside State, or an outside 
State militarily intervenes on the side of an insurgent or rebel armed group 
against the armed forces of the State where the conflict is ongoing, the 
possibility arises that the conflict, which was hitherto non-international in 
character can become internationalized, triggering the applicability of the 
IAC IHL regime. The level of control necessary for the conflict to become 
internationalized is somewhat contested, but the prevailing view is that 
once a State exercises “overall control” over the OAG, the conflict be-
comes internationalized.35 While the overall control standard is not sharply 
defined and has met with a degree of criticism by some commentators,36  at 
                                                                                                                      
31.  IIHL XXXVIII ROUND TABLE, supra note 27, at 7 paraphrasing Article 1(2) of 
AP II. 
32. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia 
Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadić Interlocutory Appeal decision]. 
33. See, e.g., Geoffrey Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon and the Regulation of Armed Hostilities: The 
Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANS-
NATIONAL LAW 295 (2006). 
34. See, e.g., Noam Lubell, The War (?) against Al Qaeda, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, supra note 30, at 421, 439–40.  
35. Jann Kleffner, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: General Issues, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 35, 41–42 
(Terry Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2d ed. 2015) (citing Tadić Interlocutory Appeal decision, 
supra note 32, ¶ 122). 
36. Akande, supra note 30, at 60–61 (referring to the International Court of Justice 
judgment in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
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the very least the intervening State must have a significant role in the plan-
ning and coordinating of the military operations of the OAG.  
The more stringent “effective control” standard requires a higher de-
gree of involvement and control by the intervening State over the opera-
tions of the OAG,37 although this standard may be more relevant in terms 
of attributing the acts of the OAG to the intervening State in the realm of 
international responsibility than in classification of the conflict. The ques-
tion, however, is not completely settled as a matter of law.38 In any case, for 
the purposes of further discussion, the overall control standard will be tak-
en as the requisite standard for classification of a conflict. If an outside 
State directly intervenes militarily, the conflict can either become complete-
ly international in character if the OAG is in fact incorporated into the 
armed forces of the intervening State, but more often there will be two 
parallel conflicts; one of an international character between the intervening 
State and the territorial State if there are armed clashes between their re-
spective armed forces or the intervening State occupies part of the territory 
of the territorial State and one of a non-international character between the 
OAG and the armed forces of the territorial State.  
In NIACs the applicable treaty law is much more limited than in IACs. 
The only universally applicable treaty provision is Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions.39 In some cases, Additional Protocol II40 to the Ge-
neva Conventions may be applicable if the State where the conflict is un-
derway is a party thereto and the requisite conditions for its applicability 
have been met. In addition, there are several other conventional instru-
ments which may be applicable provided the State where the conflict is 
occurring is a party to them.41 More importantly, many of the customary 
                                                                                                                      
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶ 385–95 
(Feb. 26)). 
37. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, at 65 (June 27). 
38. Kleffner, supra note 35, at 41–42. 
39. See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 28, art. 3. 
40. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609]. 
41.  See, e.g., Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 172 Con-
vention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 
Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, Amended Dec. 21, 2001.  
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rules of IHL are applicable to NIAC. According to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) customary IHL study, there are 148 
such customary rules applicable to NIACs.42 Assuming that determination 
is an accurate rendition of the law, this has greatly narrowed the normative 
gap between the two types of conflict. Nevertheless, differences remain 
and their significance will be examined in Part V.  
 
B. Consent of the Territorial State as an Element in Conflict Classification 
 
A question of relevance in both legal theory and in the context of the clas-
sification of the conflicts in Syria is the effect of a lack of consent by a ter-
ritorial State to a military intervention by a foreign State directed against an 
OAG operating on or from its territory. In recent practice there are many 
instances in which an outside State has conducted military action against an 
OAG on the territory of another State. This is distinct from either a mili-
tary intervention by a State against the territorial State itself or a military 
intervention with the consent of the territorial State. An attack on a State’s 
armed forces or national resources (population centers, State organs, indus-
trial, and transportation and communications infrastructure) would obvi-
ously constitute an IAC.43 The lack of consent here is simply an obvious 
by-product of the fact that one State is engaged in an armed conflict with 
another through its attacks on that State. Likewise, as already indicated, an 
occupation by a State of all, or a portion of, another State’s territory will 
trigger the IAC IHL regime, irrespective of whether the occupation is for-
cibly opposed. In the case of a military intervention on the side of a State 
in an internal conflict, the conflict will remain non-international and the 
element of consent is usually clear.44  
The matter is less clear, however, when a State intervenes in another 
State’s territory without the latter’s consent and directs its military action 
solely against an OAG located in the territorial State. This usually occurs 
because the group is conducting armed acts against the intervening State 
from the territorial State. One view, which is reflected in judicial decisions 
and the writings of some authorities, is that any State intervention on an-
other State’s territory in the absence of that State’s consent will constitute 
an IAC. Under this view, the intervention is seen as necessarily constituting 
                                                                                                                      
42. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & 
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005); Kleffner, supra note 35, at 42. 
43. See supra note 28 and accompanying text; supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
44. See, e.g., Kleffner, supra note 35, at 42. 
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an intervention against that State as a consequence of its non-consensual 
character.45 The other school of thought (to which this author adheres) is 
that an intervention directed exclusively against an OAG, which does not 
target the territorial State’s organs or “national assets” (State property, criti-
cal infrastructure, industrial base, population, etc., in so far as these are 
under the control of the State), is not directed against the State, but rather 
is against the armed group and therefore remains, in principle, a NIAC 
(assuming the requisite intensity and organizational criteria are satisfied), 
notwithstanding the lack of consent by the territorial State.46 
There are cogent arguments to be made in support of both views and it 
is fair to say that the matter is not definitively settled under international 
law. However, the more persuasive view based on a number of considera-
tions, most of them pointing firmly in the same direction, is that such situa-
tions should be treated as NIACs unless there are specific reasons for de-
termining the conflict is international in character. Several of these consid-
erations will be examined, but a full treatment would require more analysis 
and discussion than is either possible or warranted here. 
First, while there is a possible prima facie violation of sovereignty in 
the event of a non-consensual military intervention in a State’s territory, 
this is not always the case. It is quite possible the intervention may have a 
credible legal basis (e.g., a U.N. Security Council mandate, self-defense or 
possibly in some cases a plea of “state of necessity.)”47 In such instances, 
                                                                                                                      
45. Akande, supra note 30, at 73. For other authors taking this view, see Marco Sassòli, 
Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law, HPCR OCCASIONAL PAPER 
SERIES 4–5 (2006); Dieter Fleck, Non-International Armed Conflicts, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 584–85 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013).   
46. See e.g., Lubell, supra note 34, at 432. Other authors taking the view that lack of 
consent does not automatically render an intervention by a State against an organized 
armed group international are listed below infra note 57. 
47. “State of necessity” is one of the grounds precluding wrongfulness identified by 
the International Law Commission in its Articles on State Responsibility (ARSIWA) of 
2001. The conditions for invoking it are stringent and its applicability to the use of force 
on another State’s territory is dubious. See Articles 25 and 26 of the ARSIWA with com-
mentary. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, arts. 25–
26, Report of the International Law Commission, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 
10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 
YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 
2001/Add.1, 80–85 (Part 2). In situations where there is no wrongful conduct on the part 
of the State where an act based on necessity takes place, such as evacuation of citizens in 
situations where there is a complete breakdown of State authority, it is sometimes argued 
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there is no violation of either the ius ad bellum or the territorial State’s sov-
ereignty and right of territorial inviolability. In the case of a Security Coun-
cil mandate, the authority for, and legality of, the intervention would be 
clear and so need not be addressed here. When self-defense is invoked, the 
issue is less straightforward. Nevertheless, there is considerable support, 
albeit not wholly without controversy, for the premise that self-defense is 
not limited to countering armed attacks which are conducted by or under 
the control of a State. Assuming there is a credible basis for acting in self-
defense against an armed attack by an OAG acting autonomously from 
another State’s territory, and assuming again that the defending State di-
rected its defensive action exclusively against the OAG and remained with-
in the confines of necessity and proportionality ad bellum, the territorial 
State’s sovereignty would not necessarily be violated, even if it verbally 
protested the action. This is not the place to enter into a lengthy discussion 
of self-defense against non-State actors, but if one accepts that this is at 
least a possible legal basis, then the argument that non-consensual military 
intervention automatically constitutes a violation of sovereignty and is 
therefore directed against the territorial State loses in persuasiveness.48 
Second, even if such an intervention did constitute a violation of sov-
ereignty (either because it did not fulfil the requirements for the exercise of 
lawful self-defense or because one rejects that there is a right of self-
defense against an armed attack by an independent OAG), it does not inev-
itably follow that a non-consensual military intervention would qualify as 
an international (i.e., inter-State) armed conflict under the humanitarian law 
of armed conflict.  
                                                                                                                      
that necessity would be applicable, see Terry Gill & Paul Ducheine, Rescue of Nationals, in 
Gill & Fleck, supra note 45, at 242–43. 
48. There is abundant literature relating to the applicability of self-defense to armed 
attacks by OAGs acting independently of State control. The literature reflects divided 
views, as do the opinions of judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). See, e.g., 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES (Michael 
Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007) (with contributions by various authors, including the 
present author, on the topic). The ICJ inferred that self-defense was restricted to attacks 
by States in its Wall advisory opinion and in its Armed Activities decision. Legal Conse-
quences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶¶ 139, 194 (July 9); Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 146–47, 222–23 (Dec. 19). Both 
of these positions occasioned vigorous criticism by a number of the judges on the Court 
in their individual opinions.   
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The two bodies of law—ius ad bellum and ius in bello—are separate and 
have their own criteria for determining the lawfulness of any particular 
action. While they do act in parallel and any action must conform with 
both, in so far as both are applicable, for it to be lawful under international 
law as a whole, a violation of the ius ad bellum does not automatically qualify 
as a violation of the ius in bello, and vice versa. Likewise, there is no reason 
to assume that the classification of an armed conflict is dependent upon—
or even influenced by—the question of whether a violation of the ius ad 
bellum has occurred.49 If it were, this would undermine one of the cardinal 
principles of the humanitarian law of armed conflict, namely, the principle 
of equal application of the law to the belligerent parties. Moreover, if nei-
ther the intervening State nor the territorial State are engaged in hostilities 
or are supporting a party to an armed conflict, there is no presumption that 
they are belligerent parties vis-à-vis each other.  
It is true that an intervention may impact portions of a State’s popula-
tion or its national resources, but to the extent these are located where the 
OAG is active, it is likely that in most cases they will not be under the con-
trol of the territorial State. Nor would attacks directed against the OAG 
result in civilians or civilian objects being divested of protection, since any 
attack on the OAG which might affect civilians or civilian objects would be 
subject to virtually the same degree of protection from the effects of hostil-
ities under the legal regime applicable to NIACs as they enjoy under the 
regime pertaining to IACs. In any case, when a population and public 
property are under the control of an OAG and not under the effective con-
trol of the territorial State, they can no longer be identified with that State 
for purposes of determining the legal constraints on the conduct of hostili-
ties. In the event the intervening State’s action resulted in occupation of 
territory, this would change the situation and trigger the regime pertaining 
to IACs. Absent a clear basis such as occupation, there is no compelling 
reason to assume that attacks directed against an OAG operating from a 
State’s territory are tantamount to attacks on the State and that the regime 
pertaining to IACs is the most plausible option or is required from a hu-
manitarian standpoint.  
If the intervening and territorial States are engaged in hostilities with 
each other or if members of the armed forces of either are taken prisoner 
by the other State, those actions would trigger the applicability of the re-
gime pertaining to IACs for as long as such hostilities or detention took 
                                                                                                                      
49. Lubell, supra note 34, at 432–33. 
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place. It is thus the factual situation that triggers such applicability, not 
simply the (possible) violation of sovereignty. As a result of the exchange 
of hostilities and/or detention of individuals, the requirements of Common 
Article 250 would be met under the first shot approach. Whether the con-
flict between the States in question continues would depend completely on 
the conduct of the respective parties (whether or not the fighting and/or 
detention continue) and on the humanitarian requirement to provide the 
most favorable degree of protection to the affected individuals, not on the 
question of consent (or lack thereof) to the intervention. Similarly, if civil-
ians come under the power of the intervening State and are detained for 
security reasons, either on the territory of the intervening State or else-
where, this would trigger the applicability of the IAC regime for protection 
of civilians. In each of these cases, this would be a consequence of the fac-
tual circumstances and humanitarian considerations and would not hinge 
on the lack of consent to the intervention.51 
Third, neither the text of the relevant provisions in the Geneva Con-
ventions (Common Articles 2 and 3) nor the original ICRC commentaries 
thereto contain any reference to violation of sovereignty as a criterion for 
determining the character of the armed conflict. Common Article 3 relating 
to non-international armed conflicts provides for applicability of that pro-
vision “[i]n the case of an armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” An 
armed conflict between a State and an OAG on the territory of another 
State falls within this definition as has been pointed out by a number of 
commentators.52 The terms of Common Article 2 relating to international 
armed conflicts refer to three basic situations that will trigger the existence 
of an international armed conflict: a declaration of war, an armed conflict 
between States, and occupation (total or partial, resisted or unresisted) of one 
State’s territory by another. The Commentary to the First Geneva Conven-
tion makes it clear that, absent a declaration of war (which only rarely oc-
curs today), the facts on the ground will determine the applicability of 
                                                                                                                      
50. See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 28, art. 2 (“[T]he present Convention 
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not rec-
ognized by one of them.”). 
51. Kleffner, supra note 35, at 43–44.  
52. See, e.g., Lubell, supra note 34, at 435; Claus Kress, Some Reflections on the International 
Legal Framework Governing Transnational Armed Conflicts, 15 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECU-
RITY LAW 245 (2010). 
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Common Article 2, referring specifically to hostilities between States.53 Like-
wise, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s Tadić 
judgment, the leading judicial decision on the classification of armed con-
flicts, specifically mentions “the resort to armed force between States,”54 
which clearly implicates hostilities between them. Neither the 1952 ICRC 
Commentary nor the Tadić judgment cites violation of territory or sovereignty 
as a criterion for determining the classification of the conflict.55 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, there are many indications from 
actual State practice (both verbal and non-verbal) that action by an inter-
vening State which is directed solely against an armed group conducting 
operations from another State does not automatically trigger an interna-
tional armed conflict simply because it is non-consensual, or because the 
existence of consent is unclear or disputed. Examples include drone strikes 
by the United States against various jihadist armed groups in Pakistan and 
Yemen, the intervention of Turkey against PKK positions in northern Iraq, 
cross-border action by the armed forces of Kenya into Somalia in pursuit 
of Al Shabaab fighters, and Colombian incursions into Ecuador against 
FARC rebels. In none of these did any of the States concerned ever con-
sider themselves in a situation of armed conflict with each other. Nor did 
the interventions result in hostilities between the armed forces of the States 
concerned, force directed against the national resources of the territorial 
State or occupation of territory, any one of which would have triggered an 
international armed conflict between them, even though in some of these 
cases no consent was forthcoming or was, at the least, unclear or disputed. 
This is also true of the intervention of the anti-ISIS coalition in Syria as will 
be discussed presently.  
While one may object that the lack of hostilities between the interven-
ing and territorial States in these examples may be in whole or in part due 
to other factors, it is undeniable that in none of them did the States con-
cerned either verbally or factually conduct themselves as if they were in-
volved in an armed conflict, even though they may not have consented to 
the interventions and may have considered them a violation of their sover-
eignty (irrespective of whether they did constitute such violations). The 
                                                                                                                      
53. ICRC COMMENTARY (1952), supra note 28, at 32. 
54. Tadić Interlocutory Appeal decision, supra note 32, ¶ 70. 
55. The Tadić judgment made no reference to consent or violation of sovereignty as 
determining whether force between States had been used. Id. Neither does the 1952 
Commentary to Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions. ICRC COMMENTARY (1952), supra 
note 28, at 32. 
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principal exceptions to these examples, the intervention of various States in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 1990s and the 2006 conflict 
between Israel and Hezbollah which was fought in Lebanon, are indeed 
generally considered to have been IACs for a number of reasons, but not 
simply because they lacked the consent of the territorial State. In fact, those 
interventions can easily be used in support of the contention that consent 
is not the determining factor. In each case, the parties’ conduct (occupation 
of territory, attacks on the State’s infrastructure, plundering of natural re-
sources, blockade of the coast of the territorial State, etc.) was certainly 
more important in the classification of the situation as an IAC than the 
simple lack of governmental consent to the intervention. 
Fifth, and finally, it would seem that most authorities take the position 
that the classification of armed conflicts primarily (but not exclusively) 
turns on the nature of the parties (i.e., that at least one of them is a non-
State actor) and not on the existence or lack of consent by the territorial 
State. While academic publications are not a primary source of international 
law, they are indicative of a leading interpretation when it points prepon-
derantly in a particular direction and is, moreover, supported by other con-
siderations, as is the case here.56 However, it is also true that the most re-
cent version of the ICRC Commentary on Common Article 2 states that  
 
it is useful to recall that the population and public property of the territo-
rial State may also be present in areas where the armed group is present 
and some group members may also be residents or citizens of the territo-
rial State, such that attacks against the armed group will concomitantly af-
fect the local population and the State’s infrastructure. For these reasons 
and others, it better corresponds to the factual reality to conclude that an 
international armed conflict arises between the territorial State and the in-
tervening State when force is used on the former’s territory without its 
consent.57  
                                                                                                                      
56. While headcounts do not make the law, it is probably true to say that most au-
thors take the position that the nature of the parties is more important than the factor of 
consent. See Akande, supra note 30, at 75 (who despite taking the opposite position admits 
that his is probably a minority view). For authors sharing Akande’s view, see Sassòli, supra 
note 45, at 4–5; Fleck, supra note 45, at 584–85. The contrary view is held, inter alia, by 
most of the other contributors to INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF 
CONFLICTS, supra note 30. See Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Conclusions, in id. at 478, 484. 
57. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO GENEVA 
CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND 
SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶ 262 (2d ed. 2016),  https://www.icrc.org/a 
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While there are good arguments opposing the points raised in this state-
ment (e.g., if the population and public property affected are not under the 
control of the territorial State) and the conclusion reached, the position 
taken by the ICRC cannot be ignored. It is primarily because of the ICRC’s 
position that it is not possible to conclusively state, despite the reasons put 
forward here, that consent is not a relevant (and for some a determining) 
factor. But, on balance, the arguments in favor of assuming that non-
consensual intervention automatically renders an armed conflict interna-
tional seem considerably less persuasive, at least to this author, than those 
which make the classification of the conflict dependent on the factual situa-
tion, including such factors as 
 
 the nature of the parties involved in hostilities (are both parties 
States or is one of them an OAG),  
 the manner in which the intervention is conducted (is it directed 
solely against the non-State armed group),  
 whether there is an occupation of territory by the intervening State, 
 whether the intervening State detains persons,  
 the existence or lack of any effective control over territory, popula-
tion and State infrastructure in the area effected by the territorial 
State, 
 the relationship between the targeted armed group and the territo-
rial State (are they allied or opposed to each other), and  
 other possibly relevant factors.  
 
Hence, while the matter is still not settled law, the question of lack of con-
sent in itself is not the most persuasive factor in determining the classifica-
tion of an armed conflict.  
 
IV.  DETERMINATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF THE ONGOING ARMED 
CONFLICTS IN SYRIA  
 
When determining whether there are one or multiple armed conflicts cur-
rently underway in Syria and in classifying the nature of these conflicts, 
                                                                                                                      
pplic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=BE2D518CF5DE
54EAC1257F7D0036B518 (last visited June 15, 2016). 
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there are a number of factors to be taken into account. First, there are a 
number of main contenders58 which are active, each with a clear degree of 
organization and specific aims, notwithstanding a certain degree of fluidity 
in alignments, and a large number of armed groups which are active in the 
overall conflict. However, there can be no doubt that at least since early 
2012, given the degree of organization of the main opposition groups and 
the intensity of the fighting, the threshold of a non-international armed 
conflict, to which there were multiple parties, was crossed. The main par-
ties are set out in Part II and include the Syrian government and its associ-
ated militias, and the main opposition groups gathered into two loose coali-
tions, one more secular and the other Islamist in nature. These two coali-
tions form the mainstream opposition. While they have reportedly clashed 
on occasion at a local level, they share the common objective of over-
throwing the current Syrian government and cooperate more often than 
not in pursuing that goal. Together or separately they constitute a party (or 
two parties) to the conflict with the Syrian government and its associated 
forces which constitute another party. 
 A separate party to this NIAC is made up of a variety of aligned ex-
treme jihadist groups reportedly associated with Al Qaida, the most im-
portant of which to date is the Al Nusra Front. It shares the mainstream 
opposition’s goal of overthrowing the Syrian government, but has its own 
agenda and is not allied with the mainstream opposition, even though they 
share a common main adversary. It is sufficiently organized and in control 
of a significant enough portion of Syrian territory to be seen as a party in 
its own right.  
The same is undoubtedly true of ISIS, which split from the Al Nusra 
Front and has been active in the conflict since 2013. It has pursued its own 
objective of establishing a self-styled Islamist caliphate and opposes the 
Syrian government, the mainstream opposition coalitions and the Kurdish 
armed groups. It has also clashed with its ideological “cousin,” the Al 
Nusra Front, since an abortive merger attempt in 2014. It controls a signif-
icant amount of territory and population within Syria and, as such, is a sep-
arate party to the conflict.  
Finally, there are the Kurdish militias and political organizations, prin-
cipally the Kurdish National Council, the Kurdish Supreme Committee and 
                                                                                                                      
58. For information concerning the identity of the parties to the conflicts and their re-
spective objectives and alignments, see supra Part II. 
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the main Kurdish armed group, the YPG. They too have a separate agenda 
and control sufficient territory to be ranked as a party to the conflict.  
The fact that these parties have different objectives and have clashed 
with one another on occasion (or in the case of ISIS and the Kurdish YPG 
on an ongoing basis) does not change the fact that there is one overall con-
flict of a non-international character within Syria with a number of differ-
ent parties. The alternative of looking at each conflict as a separate conflict 
makes no factual or legal sense. To compare a historical example, the Thir-
ty Years War in Europe59 had a large number of parties, each with separate 
goals and shifting patterns of alignment, but is seen as one overall conflict. 
There is no reason to assess the Syrian conflict differently and, in any case, 
whether there is one overall NIAC or multiple NIACs, the applicable law is 
the same. 
The intervention of Russian and Iranian forces on the side of the Syri-
an government does not affect the classification of the conflict or amount 
to a separate conflict as they are in direct support of the government. Nor 
is there any evidence that either of those States exercise control (as op-
posed to mere influence) over the Syrian government.  
Alongside this non-international conflict, there has been a separate 
conflict between ISIS and the anti-ISIS coalition States since the coalition 
commenced aerial operations against ISIS-held positions and forces in Syr-
ia in August 2014. For the reasons set forth in Part III concerning consent 
as an element in conflict classification, this author takes the position that 
this separate conflict is also non-international, notwithstanding the lack of 
consent by the Syrian government. Coalition actions are directed almost 
exclusively against ISIS, which is in firm control of a significant portion of 
Syrian territory, population and infrastructure, rather than Syrian govern-
ment-held territory, population or infrastructure. (The United States is 
conducting operations against the Al-Nusra aligned Khorasan Group, 
which is also engaged in a NIAC with the Syrian government and, like ISIS, 
controls a portion of Syrian territory, population and infrastructure). The 
operations have not resulted in overall or effective control of an armed 
group active in the conflict by a State within the coalition or occupation of 
Syrian territory, either of which would have internationalized the conflict. 
Nor does U.S. air support to Kurdish militias on the ground engaged with 
ISIS result in internationalization of the conflict. Moreover, neither Syria, 
                                                                                                                      
59. For a brief history, see Thirty Years War, HISTORY (2009), http://www.history.com/ 
topics/thirty-years-war.  
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nor the States in the coalition consider themselves to be in an armed con-
flict with each other and no action has occurred between them that would 
trigger an inter-State conflict and the applicability of the IAC IHL regime. 
Consequently, it can be seen as a separate armed conflict of a non-
international character. 
There is arguably a third armed conflict underway between Turkish 
forces and the Kurdish militias and administration in northern Syria. Previ-
ously, there had been a number of sporadic clashes between Turkish forces 
and Kurdish militias along the border, but these have increased in intensity 
since February 2016. The advances of the Syrian army into northern Syria 
in February around Aleppo with Russian air support opened the way for 
Kurdish forces to consolidate control over the Kurdish areas along the 
Syrian/Turkish border. In response, Turkey stepped up shelling and air-
strikes against YPG positions since it views the YPG as an extension of the 
PKK, with which it is in conflict inside Turkey, and is opposed to the 
YPG’s goal of establishing a viable autonomous Kurdish region across the 
border.60 The number and intensity of Turkish strikes against the Syrian 
Kurds strongly suggest that the NIAC threshold has been crossed. If so, 
this would be a separate NIAC within Syria as the parties in the other con-
flicts are different and the aims of the contenders here are distinct from the 
participants in the other conflicts. The same arguments supporting the de-
termination that the anti-ISIS coalition airstrikes constitute a NIAC are 
equally applicable to this conflict. There has been no clash to date between 
Turkish forces and the Syrian government (aside from an aerial incident in 
the early stages of the conflict); hence the conflict between Turkey and the 
Syrian Kurdish militias (if it does qualify as such) is, for the reasons set out 
above, non-international in character.  
At the time of writing, a ceasefire is in place between the Syrian gov-
ernment and the mainstream opposition, which has, despite local viola-
tions, largely been observed since it came into force on February 26, alt-
hough it is still too early to say the parties will continue to observe it.61 
However, ISIS and Al Nusra and its associates are not included in the 
                                                                                                                      
60. See Daren Butler, Kurds’ Advance in Syria Divides U.S. and Turkey as Russia Bombs, 
REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds-
idUSKCN0VQ1FR. See also Putin the Peacemaker, supra note 7, at 31.  
61. See Syrian Ceasefire is “Largely Holding” but with Violations, AL ARABIYA ENGLISH 
(Mar. 12, 2016), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2016/03/12/Syria-
ceasefire-is-largely-holding-.html. 
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ceasefire and fighting between the Syrian government (with Russian air 
support) and ISIS, fighting between ISIS and the Kurdish YPG, and coali-
tion airstrikes against ISIS-held positions have continued. Hence, as of 
early April there are still two, and probably three, separate NIACs still on-
going. Moreover, a temporary ceasefire does not signal an end to the main 
conflict between the Syrian government and the broad array of opposition 
groups. Only a diplomatic settlement and peace agreement between some 
of the main parties or a long-term cessation of hostilities could end the 
principal conflict. However, it is unlikely any agreement would include ei-
ther ISIS or Al Nusra, in which case operations against them by various 
parties would in all probability continue.  
 
V. CONSEQUENCES OF CLASSIFICATION: (WHY) DOES IT MATTER? 
 
We can now turn to the question of the consequences of the classification 
of the conflicts in Syria in practical and legal terms and whether the classi-
fication given to them matters. It must be pointed out that this raises ques-
tions that go considerably beyond the scope of this article; therefore, there 
will be no in-depth discussion of those issues as it would require several 
more contributions to treat each of them in a comprehensive fashion. 
Nevertheless, the most important consequences will be addressed with the 
degree of discussion required to round off this subject. 
The first consequence is obvious; namely, that classification of a con-
flict as either international or non-international will determine the applica-
ble regime of IHL pertaining to it. While the gap between the two types of 
armed conflict has narrowed in the last two decades or so, considerable 
differences remain. While differences in terms of the law relating to the 
targeting of persons and objects and the conduct of hostilities are less im-
portant than they once were, some do remain. These include such ques-
tions as the position and status of armed groups and their individual mem-
bers, certain rules relating to the targeting of specific types of objects and 
the weapons which may be employed. However, on balance, the law relat-
ing to targeting is quite similar under the two regimes, hence for the pur-
pose of determining whether an attack is indiscriminate or disproportionate 
classification will make little difference, if any, as to whether a conflict is 
governed by the rules pertaining to IAC or NIAC.  
When it comes to important other areas of IHL, the situation is quite 
different. The regimes pertaining to prisoners of war and occupation are 
completely inapplicable as a matter of law (as opposed to possible policy-
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driven application) in a NIAC. The detention of persons captured or held 
for security reasons is also governed by different rules, although precisely 
what these are in the context of a NIAC is not wholly settled, in contrast to 
the relative clarity of the rules applicable in these situations in an IAC. The 
law of naval warfare is another area of the law of armed conflict which is 
only applicable in IAC. Although it has not been relevant to date in the 
Syrian conflicts, it could potentially become so if and when, for example, a 
blockade of the Syrian coast was undertaken. Likewise, the rules relating to 
criminal responsibility for violations of IHL differ in some important re-
spects, depending on the classification of the conflict. These differences in 
the IAC and NIAC regimes, while not exhaustive, serve to illustrate that 
classification continues to matter in terms of the applicable law. 
Second, the classification can affect the relationship of the various par-
ties to each other in a broader sense. For example, the fact that Russia and 
Iran are acting in support of the Syrian government and fighting alongside 
its forces and that the anti-ISIS coalition is acting without Syrian consent 
would mean that if the conflict between the coalition and ISIS is classified 
as an IAC in which the coalition States are acting against Syria and are con-
sequently “at war” with it, then they logically would also be “at war” with 
Russia and Iran as co-belligerents with Syria. Needless to say, this would 
have consequences, both legal and non-legal, which go far beyond the 
scope of the conflicts within Syria. 
A related question is the thorny issue of the geography of armed con-
flict. This is partly regulated by IHL, but also, and probably at least as im-
portantly, by other areas of international law.62 In an IAC, there is little 
disagreement that IHL applies within the territories of all States party to 
the conflict and, in principle, to international sea and airspace outside the 
territory of neutral or non-belligerent States. Whether this signifies that 
persons and objects may always be targeted anywhere within these confines 
is another matter, but the fact that IHL is applicable is not widely disputed 
and signifies that even if an attack in the sense of Article 49 of Additional 
Protocol I63 resulted in a violation of the ius ad bellum or the law of neutrali-
                                                                                                                      
62. For a somewhat more extensive treatment of how other bodies of law may affect 
targeting see, e.g., Terry Gill, Some Considerations Concerning the Role of the Ius ad Bellum in 
Targeting, in TARGETING: THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN WARFARE 101, 102–18 (Paul 
Ducheine, Michael Schmitt & Frans Osinga eds., 2016). 
63. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 49(1), June 8, 1977, 
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ty, it would not necessarily be a violation of IHL. By contrast, the NIAC 
regime is, in principle, only applicable within the State where the conflict is 
underway. While this may be extended to the territory of another State in 
the event the conflict “spills over” or if a series of related but separate NI-
ACs are underway in one or more other States, the geographical confines 
of such conflicts are both more limited, at least in the opinion of this au-
thor, and much less settled than is the case in a classic inter-State conflict. 
In principle, NIAC is a regime which, originally at least, pertained to a con-
flict within a single State and the question to what extent it can extend 
elsewhere is not presently conclusively settled and would require much 
more thorough treatment to be adequately dealt with than is possible here. 
This is so, because the matter is not simply a question of whether a NIAC 
can extend across State borders under IHL, but how IHL relates to wholly 
other areas of international law. That is an important question, but one 
which is not capable of being addressed in the context of a single article on 
the conflicts in Syria and one that will have to await further treatment.  
These are a number of the most important consequences of classifica-
tion and, while there may well be others, they suffice to illustrate that it 
does matter whether a conflict is deemed international or non-inter-
national; it certainly matters in the case of the Syrian conflicts. Anyone who 
thinks that the coalition States presently engaged in an armed conflict with 
ISIS are also at war with Syria, Iran and Russia, should think again and do a 
serious reality check. This is not simply a question of academic purity in 
applying IHL, but one which has potentially far-reaching consequences. 
The adage of “be careful what you wish for” is apropos in this context.  
 
VI. SOME CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article has attempted to make some sense of the current conflicts rag-
ing inside Syria, which have had such devastating consequences on that 
State and its population in particular, as well as upon the region and the 
wider surroundings. It has been shown that there are at least two, and ar-
guably three, separate armed conflicts in progress, all of which, it was con-
cluded, are non-international in character. In reaching this conclusion, the 
wider question of the effect of consent (or lack thereof) by a State to for-
eign military intervention on its territory was examined and shown that 
                                                                                                                      
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (“‘Attacks’” means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in 
offence or defence.”). 
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consent should not be seen as determinative of whether a conflict becomes 
international in character in the absence of objective reasons for so doing.  
Areas of contention remain and likely will remain for the foreseeable 
future as to the role that consent should play and how other factors may 
influence the determination of the nature of armed conflict in general and 
this set of conflicts in particular. Likewise, other questions relating to the 
consequences of classification remain subject to debate. These include, in 
particular, the question of the geography of armed conflict and how IHL 
relates to other bodies of international law which may affect where opera-
tions may be lawfully conducted, both in IACs and NIACs. These ques-
tions were not answered conclusively—and are not capable of being an-
swered conclusively in a single piece—hence the title of this Part, “Some 
Conclusions.” Those which have been reached hopefully provide some 
clarity and the arguments put forward on the open questions may serve to 
further the discussion. But in any case, the underlying purpose of this arti-
cle is to provide some clarity on the classification of the conflicts underway 
in Syria. Whatever one thinks on this and the questions raised but not con-
clusively answered, this should not affect the fact that classification matters 
and that one should be wary of drawing conclusions which open the door 
to a widening of the conflict, or which result in losing sight of the main 
tragedy which the situation in Syria has caused—and continues to cause—
regardless of the classification.  
 
 
 
     
